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CLONING AND POSITIVE LIBERTY
M. CATHLEEN KAvENY*
INTRODUCTION
In February 1996, Scottish scientist Ian Walmut introduced
the world to Dolly, a female sheep whose placid visage revealed
absolutely no trace of her unique status as the world's first mam-
malian clone. The sudden revelation of Dolly's existence dis-
quieted ordinary citizens and policy makers alike; if scientists can
clone sheep, most people believed, they will soon be able to
clone human beings. A virtually unanimous consensus quickly
formed that any effort to produce a human child through the
process of somatic cell nuclear transfer was not only wrong, but
repulsive. Transfixed by nightmarish images from Brave New
World1 or The Boys from Brazil,2 the American public called upon
lawmakers to put a halt to the inexorable march of scientific
"progress" in the area of human cloning. Responding to this out-
cry, President Clinton issued an immediate moratorium on the
use of federal funds to support attempts to produce a child
through somatic cell nuclear transfer, and gave the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission three months to submit a report
on the ethical and legal ramifications of human cloning.
Surprisingly, by the time the Commission issued the Report
in June 1996,' the groundswell of public sentiment against
human cloning had largely dissipated. The implications of Wil-
mut's discovery were quickly superceded on the editorial pages
by other events. The consensus that human cloning could never
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. This is a revised
version of a lecture that Professor Kaveny gave at a conference on cloning and
the law, sponsored by the Notre Dame Alumni Association, in Washington, D.C.
in November of 1998.
1. ALDOUS HuxLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
2. THE BOYS FROM BRAZIL (ITC Films 1978).
3. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HuMAN
BEINGS: REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS (June 1997) [hereinafter CLONING
REPORT].
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be morally justified began to chip away, piece by piece. After the
initial shock, American lawmakers slowly but surely folded clon-
ing into the laissez-faire stance they have taken toward earlier
benchmarks in the rapidly developing field of reproductive
medicine, such as in vitro fertilization or the freezing of human
embryos.
The Report contributes to the domestication of human clon-
ing in both tone and substance. First, by attempting to translate
the visceral antipathy that many persons express toward the pos-
sibility of human cloning into a set of rationally assessable objec-
tions, the Report saps that antipathy of much of its force.4
Second, by prominently featuring the indisputably rare "hard
cases" that some moralists have proposed as examples of when
cloning might be justified, the Report makes it plausible for
Americans to consider the ethical status of cloning as a matter of
legitimate dispute. That, in turn, makes it easier to resist calls to
institute broad legal prohibitions against cloning as unwarranted
restrictions of human freedom, at least once the procedure has
proven to be effective and physically safe for both the cloned
child and the surrogate mother who carries it to term.
But what does proper respect for human freedom actually
require of the law in the case of human cloning? Whose freedom
is at stake? That of the parents or that of the child? The stance
adopted by the United States toward regulation of reproductive
technologies thus far has protected a nearly absolute negative
freedom of adults to have their "own" child (i.e., a child biologi-
cally related to oneself or one's partner), virtually unimpeded by
anything but the limits of science. It has not, however, paid
much attention to the positive freedom of the child to come into
existence under conditions that will enable her to become an
autonomous person of equal dignity with her parents, capable of
deliberating upon and choosing a life-plan for herself. Nor has it
paid sufficient attention to the fact that freedom has a social
dimension; a culture which truly values autonomy must insure
that the conditions of freedom are protected, promoted, and
passed down to the next generation.
In this essay, I would like to suggest that the laissez-faire
American attitude toward emerging reproductive technologies
provides us with an inadequate model for regulating human
cloning, precisely because it fails to attend to the developing
autonomy of the child and the importance of a culture that sup-
4. On the moral force of such antipathy, see Leon Kass, The Wisdom of
Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Humans, NEw REPUBLIC, June 2,
1997, at 17, reprinted in 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 679 (1998).
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ports autonomy. Far from requiring us to refrain from imposing
any restrictions upon human cloning, proper respect for human
freedom may require us to set stringent legal limitations upon its
use, perhaps even to ban it entirely. First, I will briefly sketch the
broader context in which the debate about the legal status of
cloning and the law will be situated, attempting to give some
sense of how both the federal and state governments have
treated some of the related issues the new reproductive technolo-
gies have raised in the area of medical research, ethics, and fam-
ily law. I will also show how the advent of human cloning will
exacerbate some of the problems already created by those
technologies.
Second, drawing upon the work of the liberal legal philoso-
pher Joseph Raz, I will attempt to make the case, at least in out-
line form, that cloning undermines the positive freedom of the
children whom it brings into being. Furthermore, permitting
the practice of human cloning, even on a comparatively limited
basis, will erode essential cultural supports for the value of auton-
omy. On these grounds, I will suggest that liberal legal theory,
properly understood, justifies measures designed to restrict or
even to prevent the practice of human cloning, despite their
interference with the negative liberty of those persons who wish
to produce a child through somatic cell nuclear transfer.
I. SITUATING CLONING WITHIN THE AMERICAN LEGAL CONTEXT
The prospect of producing a human being by somatic cell
nuclear transfer lies at the intersection of three areas of law: (1)
federal and state law on the experimentation on human subjects;
(2) federal and state regulation of the practices of fertility clinics,
which are the likely sites of any successful efforts to clone a
human being; and (3) family law, which is largely the province of
the states, although the United States Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Constitution as protecting certain aspects of an indi-
vidual's decisions regarding marriage and childbirth (e.g.,
contraception, abortion). None of the three areas appears to be
governed by a legal philosophy that is sufficiently coherent and
sophisticated to deal with the problems likely to arise because of
human cloning.
A. Experimentation
In order to produce a human clone, scientists must produce
a human embryo in vitro using the techniques of somatic cell
nuclear transfer, implant that embryo in a surrogate mother, and
bring the pregnancy successfully to term. The techniques
1999]
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involved in this process arguably involve experimentation on
human embryos, and later, on human fetuses. Largely for polit-
ical reasons, neither federal nor state law has developed provi-
sions that adequately address the ethical and practical issues
arising out of such experimentation.
At the federal level, the effort to grapple with the ethics of
fetal research was stymied for political reasons. In 1994, the
National Institutes of Health ("NIH") issued a controversial
report on that question, which recommended that some types of
such research be both permitted and federally funded, while
other types be prohibited outright by federal law.5 In response
to the controversy, Congress chose political expediency over
moral coherence to guide American policy on embryo research.
No form of embryo research, even that deemed most trouble-
some by the NIH panel, is prohibited by federal law. At the same
time, no research, even that judged to be most promising by the
panel, is subsidized by federal funding. No side in the polarized
American debate over abortion and the status of the fetus can
claim absolute victory; yet each can claim an absolute rule as its
political spoils. A few years later, Congress folded cloning into
this fragile political compromise, explicitly incorporating
research in that area into its ban on the use of federal funds to
support research on human embryos.6
By and large, state law does not fill the regulatory gap. Only
a minority of states have enacted laws restricting experimentation
on the unborn; in some of these, the relevant restrictions are
designed to protect fetuses destined for abortion and do not
apply to human embryos, especially before implantation. In
short, American researchers determined to perfect the tech-
niques of somatic cell nuclear transfer on human cells in vitro
would not face significant impediments from either federal or
state law, provided that they are able to obtain private funding
for their efforts.
But what about the next step? Once the technique for creat-
ing a cloned embryo is perfected, what legal strictures will deter a
determined researcher from implanting that embryo in a willing
surrogate mother for gestation, provided that she is willing to
abort at the first sign of trouble? Again, state and federal law
include no explicit provisions governing this possibility. It is
5. See AD Hoc GROUP OF CONSULTANTS TO THE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE
DIR., NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL
(1994).
6. See Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-78,
§ 513(a), 111 Stat. 1467 (1997).
CLONING AND POST17VE LIBERTY
arguable that such an attempt would trigger the federal provi-
sions governing research on human subjects. More specifically,
one might argue that the gestational mother would count as such
a subject; it is less clear that the cloned fetus would qualify, since
the "experimentation" in question took place before implanta-
tion.7 In any event, cautious researchers likewise would be able
to sidestep these provisions, simply by ensuring that these experi-
ments are not directly or indirectly subsidized with federal mon-
ies. The federal guidelines for research on human subjects do
riot apply across the board, but only to recipients of federal fund-
ing. Not surprisingly, most state laws governing the protection of
human research subjects are not onerous; many states do not
even have such laws; many of those that do are not obviously
applicable in this situation.
Assuming that some researchers take the foregoing initial
and intermediate steps toward the birth of a human clone, what
law will prevent them from taking the last step and asking the
surrogate mother to carry the fetus to term? It is only this last
step that is the focus of the National Bioethics Advisory Commis-
sion's three major recommendations for public policy on clon-
ing. The Commission called for a continued ban on federal
funding of attempts to "create a child by somatic cell nuclear
transfer"; it also called upon researchers and clinicians not cov-
ered by the ban to comply with its spirit through a voluntary mor-
atorium. Finally, the Commission encouraged Congress to enact
federal legislation (with a sunset clause) prohibiting all attempts
to "create a child" through the cloning process, no matter
whether the funding for such efforts was public or private.8
On its face, the activity targeted for prohibition by the Com-
mission does not include either the creation and cultivation of a
cloned human embryo in vitro or the gestation of a cloned
human fetus in a surrogate mother, provided that the clone is
aborted before birth. The Commission explicitly carved the first
stage of the cloning process out of its sphere of concern on the
grounds that the topic had already been considered by the NIH
Panel on Human Embryo Research; it remained strangely silent
about the second stage of the process. Yet a moment's reflection
reveals that any serious legislative efforts to prevent the birth of
the cloned child will need to focus its attention on earlier
benchmarks in the cloning process. First, perfection of the tech-
7. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.124, 46.203 (1998) (defining fetus as "the
product of conception from the time of implantation .... " (emphasis added)).
8. See CLONING REPORT, supra note 3, at iii-iv (Executive Summary) (June
1997) <http://bioethics.gov/pubs/executive.pdf>.
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niques of human cloning in vitro is likely to create a virtually irre-
sistible temptation to bring them to fruition by transferring the
embryo to a woman's womb for gestation. Second, after such a
transfer is made, those directing the experiment lose a substan-
tial amount of control over the outcome; it is virtually unthink-
able that any court would enforce a contractual provision
requiring the surrogate mother to have an abortion against her
will. Consequently, once the in vitro techniques for cloning have
been perfected, the only reliable way to prevent the birth of a
clone will be to prohibit its transfer to a woman's womb. It is
therefore even more surprising that the Report did not adopt a
broader focus of concern, perhaps defining its prohibited activity
as "the attempt to transfer a human embryo created by somatic
cell nuclear transfer to a woman's womb for gestation."
Congress did not accede to the Commission's request to
prohibit attempts to create a child through somatic cell nuclear
transfer. Although several anti-cloning bills were introduced,
including some that were far more restrictive than the Commis-
sion's own proposals, none were passed. In response to the brief
resurgence of public sentiment against cloning caused by Rich-
ard Seed's announcement of his quickly discredited plans to
institute a broad program of human cloning, the federal Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") asserted its jurisdiction over
the "safety and efficacy" of attempts to produce a live-born
human being through the cloning process, just as it had earlier
asserted jurisdiction over gene therapy.9 While the statutory
basis of the FDA's authority to take this step is rather unclear, its
pragmatic value is clearly evident.1 ° In essence, the FDA accom-
plished indirectly the goals that the Commission had requested
that Congress achieve directly, thereby deflecting the call for
more restrictive legislation.
B. Fertility Clinics
The second aspect of the law likely to be implicated by the
prospect of cloning is evident when we consider which parties
are likely to make cloning available to the general public. Fertil-
ity clinics, of course, are the obvious candidates to do so. Once
equipped to perform the technique of somatic cell nuclear trans-
fer, they can add it to the array of services they already offer to
9. See Rick Weiss, Human Clone Research Will Be Regulated: FDA Asserts It Has
Statutory Authority to Regulate Attempts at Human Cloning, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,
1998, at Al.
10. See David Kessler et al., Regulation of Somatic Cell Therapy and Gene
Therapy by the Food and Drug Administration, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1169 (1993).
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infertile couples and individuals, which include not only artificial
insemination with a husband or donor's sperm, egg donation, in
vitro fertilization using spouse or donor gametes, and increas-
ingly, genetic screening and selective implantation.
However, neither federal nor state lawmakers have kept up
with the quickly evolving techniques of artificial reproduction, or
the established procedures governing the record-keeping or
safety practices of the fertility industry. In 1992, Congress passed
the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act,"1 which
imposes success rate reporting requirements, not substantive
standards of quality, on fertility clinics. While the Act requires
the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS") to
develop a model program for states to use in certifying laborato-
ries using human embryos, as of January 1999, no such program
has been unveiled. The legal situation is not significantly more
developed on the state level. Few states impose their own regula-
tions on fertility clinics; most have been slow to exercise much
control over the circumstances under which artificial insemina-
tion (donor), egg donation, in vitro fertilization, embryo screen-
ing for genetic defects, and surrogate motherhood are
practiced.12 Consequently, there are few monitoring or regula-
tory procedures in place capable of deterring an enterprising fer-
tility clinic from discretely adding cloning to the array of services
it offers.
C. Family Law
The third legal realm where the prospect of human cloning
poses special challenges is family law, which is largely the prov-
ince of the states. Here again, the most reliable indication of
how they would deal with cloning's potential to alter the tradi-
tional family structure is to look at how they have addressed the
new familial relationships made possible by reproductive tech-
nologies already available to the public. In the vast majority of
these cases, the fundamental issue is not whether any such tech-
nologies should be unavailable in a particular situation or range
of situations, but rather how to sort through the claims of those
involved in the creation of the child in order to determine who
are the "natural parents."
Many states have adopted laws stating that in the case of a
married woman who gives birth to a child conceived by artificial
insemination with donated sperm with the consent of her hus-
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to a-7 (1994).
12. See Karen M. Ginsberg, FDA Approved? A Critique of the Artificial
Insemination Industy in the United States, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 823 (1997).
1999]
22 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13
band, the husband, not the sperm donor, should be considered
the child's natural father. Unfortunately, most have not kept up
with the new permutations in biological parenthood made possi-
ble in recent years, such as surrogate motherhood, gestational
surrogacy, egg donation, or embryo donation. Nor have they
kept up with the increasing variety of persons who may seek to
use them, including single people and same-sex couples. Only
two states (North Dakota and Virginia) have enacted a version of
the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act,
which attempts to sort through some basic questions of parental
rights and responsibilities with respect to children born as a
result of the new reproductive technologies."3 Because state leg-
islators are reluctant to take a stand on such sensitive and contro-
versial practices, the persons using them frequently do so without
certainty about the legal status of their relationship with the child
they are about to bring into existence. In some instances, rela-
tionships between those seeking to rear the child and those pro-
viding gametes or gestational services may deteriorate, forcing
the courts to intervene to settle the matter.
14
As reproductive technology has progressed, the number of
persons potentially involved in the creation of one child has
expanded. When most of us think of cloning, we think of the
concentration of parenthood in one individual: the "template"
whose nuclear DNA provides most of the genetic pattern for the
clone. However, it is also important to recognize that cloning
exacerbates the fissure of parental relationships already begun by
existing technologies. More specifically, at least eight persons
can potentially be involved in the creation of a human clone: (1)
the initiator of the cloning process; (2) the template; (3) - (4)
the parents of the template, who will also be the clone's genetic
parents (leaving aside the mitochondrial DNA); (5) the donor of
the enucleated egg that is fused with the template's nucleus (who
contributes the mitochondrial DNA); (6) the gestational surro-
gate; and (7) - (8) the rearing parents.
13. See Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -07 (1997); Status of Children of Assisted
Conception, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (1995).
14. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (involving a
dispute between a married couple (the natural mother and natural father) and
the surrogate mother, who bore their fertilized embryo to term); In Re Baby M,
537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (involving the question of who has "parental rights,"
as between a natural mother, natural father, and his wife, where the natural
mother was artificially inseminated with sperm from the natural father,
according to the terms of a surrogacy contract).
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Will any of these individuals have a right to produce a child
through the cloning process? Conversely, will any of them have a
right to prevent the creation of a clone to whom they stand in
some relationship? Who counts as the natural parents of the
clone? Once cloning becomes a scientific reality, the law will
need to answer these questions in order to give shape to clon-
ing's social reality. As the recent writings of legal theorist John
Robertson demonstrate, making room for cloning may require
liberal legal theorists to modify substantially their theories of
reproductive freedom. More specifically, in his previous writings,
Robertson, like other liberal theorists, has placed two elements at
the center of his theory: (1) the identification of reproductive
freedom's core concern with the creation of a child to whom one
has a genetic tie; and (2) the paramount importance of an indi-
vidual's right to negative reproductive freedom (i.e., not to bring
into being a child with whom one has a genetic connection). 15
For Robertson and other liberal theorists, an individual's
right to make use of contraception and abortion to avoid bring-
ing a child into the world to whom he or she has a genetic tie is
virtually paramount; it regularly trumps positive reproductive lib-
erty.' 6 According to Robertson, a man should be able to prevent
his former wife from implanting and carrying to term frozen
embryos conceived in vitro with his sperm, since her right to bod-
ily integrity is not involved in this decision. Conversely, she may
prevent him from hiring a surrogate mother to carry the embryos
until birth.1 7
At the same time, in order to defend the importance of posi-
tive reproductive liberty, Robertson emphasizes the strong desire
that many people have for a child who is biologically related to
them. In many of his writings, he argues that it is this biological
connection, this genetic connection, that is the essence of repro-
duction; it is something for which adoption cannot serve as a sub-
stitute."' Because many persons view the creation of a parent-
child relationship as an essential part of their plan for their own
lives, Robertson argues that the right to do so is a protected
aspect of human autonomy. By extension, he contends that per-
sons who are unable to reproduce naturally have a positive right
15. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 22-23 (1994).
16. Robertson, of course, does not recognize a man's right to force a
woman carrying his child to have an abortion against her will. This position can
be justified, not because her positive right to have a child trumps his negative
right to refrain from so doing, but because a forced abortion would be a gross
invasion of her bodily integrity.
17. See Robertson, supra note 15, at 28-29.
18. See id. at 22.
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to avail themselves of new techniques in reproductive technology
in order to have a child who is genetically related to them. Since
it takes the gametes of two individuals to produce a child, this
right includes the choice to use the gametes of individuals willing
to allow them to be used for that purpose.' 9
According to Robertson, virtually all forms of cloning can be
brought within the ambit of reproductive freedom.2 ° However,
in order to make his case, he is forced to abandon, or at least to
radically qualify, the two elements of a liberal approach to repro-
ductive freedom outlined above. Robertson suggests, for exam-
ple, that an individual should be able to clone herself without
obtaining the consent of her parents, despite the fact that they
will also be the genetic parents of the clone (leaving aside the
contribution made by the small amount of DNA contained in the
mitochondria).2 Furthermore, he believes that parents of a
minor child should be able to clone that child, despite the fact
that she is unable to give a legally valid consent to the proce-
dure.22 The only absolute limit he is willing to place on cloning
would prevent persons from initiating the cloning process with-
out making the commitment to rear the resulting child to
adulthood.23
In both of these examples, Robertson takes positions in
great tension with the basic premises of his own defense of repro-
ductive liberty. Giving priority to negative reproductive freedom
should mean that persons will be able to veto cloning procedures
that would place them in parental or quasi-parental relationships
with cloned children without their consent. More specifically, it
would suggest that an individual should be required to seek the
consent of her own biological parents before cloning herself,
because her parents would also be the genetic parents of the
clone (leaving aside, of course, the contribution made by the
mitochondrial DNA). Their negative right to prevent the crea-
tion of a child to whom they are the genetic parents should take
precedence over their first child's desire to clone herself.
Robertson can reply that the negative reproductive liberty of
the parents of the template is not affected, because they will not
be charged with responsibility for raising the child. However,
such a response clearly abandons an understanding of the right
19. SeeJohn A. Robertson, Liberalism and the Limits of Procreative Liberty: A
Response to My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 233, 240-43 (1995).
20. SeeJohn A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L.
REv. 1371, 1388-403 (1998).
21. See id. at 1448-49.
22. See id. at 1446.
23. See id. at 1442-43.
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to reproduce that focuses on the genetic connection between
parent and child, substituting in its stead the nurturing of a child
to adulthood. Moreover, if taken seriously, it may require sub-
stantial alterations in other elements of Robertson's position.
For example, if the right to rear a child is made the keystone of
positive reproductive liberty, the focus of his efforts should be
upon insuring access to adoption, rather than insuring access to
new reproductive technologies.
It is equally difficult for Robertson to defend the view that
parents should be able to clone their minor children without
modifying his commitment to the two elements of reproductive
liberty outlined above. If the essence of reproduction is the crea-
tion of a child with whom one has a genetic tie, it would be fair to
conclude that cloning entails an innovative form of (asexual)
reproduction of the individual who serves as the template. The
priority of negative reproductive liberty would preclude parents
from cloning their minor child, who is by definition unable to
give a legally effective consent to the procedure. If parents
should not be able to force a girl child to take on an unwanted
parental role by preventing her from obtaining an abortion,
surely they should not be able to foist upon her an innovative
"parental" relationship by using her as a template for the crea-
tion of a clone.
Robertson has several potential responses to this charge, all
of which generate some type of inconsistency in his position.
First, he might deny that the relationship between the template
and the clone is truly a reproductive one; instead, he might claim
that they are genetic siblings rather than parent and child. The
reproductive liberty involved in this scenario is that of the tem-
plate's parents, who want another child who is genetically related
to them. This position, however, is difficult to reconcile with the
stance Robertson takes on the individual who wishes to clone
herself. If cloning is not reproductive activity, it is hard to see
why that individual has any right based on reproductive liberty to
clone herself. Furthermore, on this view, it is not clear why the
parents of such an individual would not have an unambiguous
negative reproductive right to prevent her from doing so.
In the end, Robertson seems to grant his imprimatur to any
arrangement in which an adult brings into being a child whom
she is willing to raise. In order to accommodate cloning, the cen-
tral meaning of reproductive freedom has been altered; discon-
nected from all the boundaries set by natural motherhood and
fatherhood, it has now become a very general liberty to cause the
generation of a new human life. The essence of that liberty is
not the creation of a child with whom one has a genetic tie; on
1999]
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Robertson's view, an individual may legitimately desire to raise a
clone of a person to whom she has no such tie. It is not merely
the right to rear a child, which would be satisfied by more exten-
sive adoption and foster parent policies. Instead, the focus of
this view of reproductive liberty has become the creation of chil-
dren who possess the genetic makeup desired by their parents.
They are literally "children of choice."
More generally, the accommodation of cloning alters the
balance between negative and positive liberty characteristic of lib-
eral political thought. Positive reproductive liberty takes on an
increasingly expansive role, because the options available to indi-
viduals seeking to have children are so much greater. One is no
longer choosing simply whether to have children, but how to
have them, as well as which children to have. Furthermore, the
value of any act taken in the name of positive reproductive liberty
is increasingly determined with reference to the goal that it is
designed to facilitate: the birth of a child in accordance with the
parents' desires.
At the same time, negative reproductive liberty shrinks in
importance as the expansion in options forces it to diffuse its
concern. What was once, in the age before reproductive technol-
ogy, a unified negative right not to become a biological or social
parent, has now become a compilation of fragmented negative
rights: the right not to initiate the cloning process, the right not
to be a template, the right not to be the genetic parents of a
template, and the right not to shoulder the responsibility of rear-
ing the clone to adulthood. Apart from the last right, it is likely
that the one small piece of the fragmented negative right not to
reproduce will carry very little weight against the substantial
desire of parents to create and raise a child of their choice.
When faced with the argument that one person's decision to ini-
tiate the cloning process will violate the negative reproductive
rights of another, an advocate of cloning can simply respond by
playing a sort of shell game, focusing attention on the aspects of
negative reproductive liberty not threatened in this particular
case. On this view the negative reproductive liberty of the par-
ents of an adult who chooses to clone herself would not be
threatened, because they will not be responsible for raising the
clone. Similarly, the negative reproductive liberty of the child
who is cloned by her parents is not at issue because she is not the
genetic mother of the clone. The shell game continues.
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II. CLONING AND POSITIVE FREEDOM
In its Report, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
approaches the issue of how to regulate human cloning with the
presuppositions supplied by liberal legal theory. More specifi-
cally, the Commission maintains that human cloning should be
prohibited outright as long as there remains a significant risk of
physical harm to the cloned child or the woman who carries it to
term. Once that risk is overcome, however, the Commission
expressed significant doubts about the acceptability of such
prohibitions, questioning whether the reproductive liberty of
those who seek to create a child through the cloning process
should be compromised on the basis of such "speculative" harms
as risk of psychological damage to the child and erosion of our
commitment to cultural ideals such as individuality.24
The thrust of the Commission's position on cloning and the
law seems to be consistent with the liberal harm principle, which
holds that the law (particularly the criminal law) should not pro-
hibit actions that do not wrongfully cause harm to the interests of
others.2" Clearly, key questions which must be answered by any
exponent of this principle include: (1) what counts as "harm";
and (2) how direct the causal connection must be between the
act in question and the harm it brings about before the act can
be prohibited. In its own approach to these questions, the Com-
mission seems to be endorsing a strict version of the harm princi-
ple. More specifically, it appears to define "harm" as properly
including only tangible, physical damage to the child or mother.
Furthermore, it seems to require a close causal connection
between the act and the alleged harm before legitimating legal
restrictions against cloning.
It is possible to criticize the Commission's jurisprudence by
arguing for a broader range of permissible answers to these two
questions. One might contend that threats to a cloned child's
psychological well-being and sense of individuality do indeed
count as harms, as do the erosion of cultural commitments such
as the conviction that children are persons whose fundamental
dignity is independent of the degree to which they satisfy the
expectations of those who brought them into existence. Simi-
24. See CLONING REPORT, supra note 3, at 87 (ch.5: Legal and Policy
Considerations) (June 1997) <http://bioethics.gov/pubs/chapter5.pdf>.
25. Liberal legal theorists trace the roots of the harm principle to John
Stuart Mill's On Liberty. SeeJohn Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ESSAYS ON POLITICS
AND SOCIETY 213 (J.M. Robson ed., 1977). The most comprehensive
contemporary effort to work through the implications of the harm principle is
Joel Feinberg's four-volume work, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (1984-
1988).
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larly, one could say that the requisite causal connection between
the act and the alleged harm can vary depending upon the grav-
ity of the harm, the likelihood that it will occur, and the impor-
tance of the act to the agents performing it.
Depending upon the breadth its definition of harm and the
stringency of its causality requirements, a legal theory pressing
these arguments might move beyond the generally recognized
scope of liberalism. For example, many liberal legal theorists
would not consider the moral corruption that a person could
cause to her own character by cloning herself (e.g., increasing
her selfishness) to be the sort of harm that justifies a legal prohi-
bition in and of itself. They would view a position advocating
restrictions on that basis as an unacceptable form of "legal moral-
ism," which does not sufficiently respect human autonomy on
two counts. First, by preventing competent adults from volunta-
rily engaging in behavior whose unacceptable consequences fall
only upon themselves, the position evinces an unacceptable form
of paternalism. Second, by counting moral corruption as a harm
in and of itself, it makes a mistake in categorization. Moral cor-
ruption, provided that it is done by leading rather than forcing
the will, changes one's interests; it does not set them back.26
There is a second way to challenge the Commission's appli-
cation of liberal legal theory to the question of cloning, which
does not involve setting other values (such as the need to pre-
serve moral character or the need to prevent harm) in opposi-
tion to freedom. Instead, it involves probing the value of
freedom even more deeply. In his important book, The Morality
of Freedom,27 the liberal legal philosopher Joseph Raz argues that
the ultimate meaning of human freedom is positive, not nega-
tive. It allows persons to forge their own identities by choosing
among a number of incompatible life-plans of incomparable
value. In his view, human freedom is important, not because it is
impossible to form a judgment that a particular form of life is
virtuous or vicious (moral skepticism), but because there exist a
number of virtuous forms of life, which cannot all be pursued
simultaneously (value pluralism). Negative freedom (i.e., free-
dom from constraint) is important only insofar as it serves posi-
tive freedom, the ability of an individual to forge her own unique
identity by working out a morally worthwhile plan for her life.
Raz acknowledges, of course, that one human being cannot
exercise autonomy on behalf of another, nor compel her to exer-
cise her own autonomy. However, human beings can help pro-
26. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 35, 65-70 (1984).
27. JOSEPH RAz, THE MoRALrry OF FREEDOM (1986).
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vide each other with the conditions that are necessary for the
exercise of autonomy. These include: (1) the mental capacities
to exercise autonomy, both intellectual and psychological; (2)
independence, understood as the absence of coercion or manip-
ulation; and (3) a range of morally worthwhile options from
which to choose. 2 ' He maintains that the task of the government
is not only to insure the second condition, but also to provide its
citizens with the first and the third as well. The tools of the legal
system can be used to insure that the conditions of autonomy are
provided to all member of the society.
29
Drawing upon Raz's analysis of the centrality of positive free-
dom, it is possible to contend that the problem with cloning is
that it threatens to undermine, if not entirely erode, the condi-
tions of autonomy for the child born of that procedure. With
respect to the first condition, regarding mental capacities, we can
ask how it will affect a child psychologically to know that she does
not have two biological parents, but only one progenitor. Is it
likely that such knowledge will affect her sense of dignity and
uniqueness in a way that will interfere with her ability to under-
stand herself as an autonomous person who is charged with
responsibility for creating her own future?
With respect to the second condition, is it not at least possi-
ble that in many cases, cloning is likely to have manipulative
effects upon the child who results from it? A child who has the
same genetic makeup as a template who is even a year or two
further down life's path may very well believe that her task is to
follow in that person's footsteps-or to turn their backs entirely
on them. She may pursue some options and rule out others,
solely on the basis of the choices made by her template. How-
ever, there is an obvious objection to this line of analysis. What,
we might ask, is the difference between a child who plans her life
in response to that of a template and the more common scenario
where a child plans her life in relation to the model provided by
a family member or friend? I believe there are two crucial differ-
ences. First, there is the strength of the expectations focused on
the child from the very beginning of her existence. The initia-
tors of the cloning process bring a child into this world with the
intention that her genetic makeup be virtually identical to that of
the template whom they have chosen for that role. They are
likely to be disappointed, or at least surprised, by any deviation.
Second, there is the pull of the model itself on the imagination
of the child. The very fact that parents and other role models
28. See id. at 369-78.
29. See id. at 415-16.
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look substantially different from a naturally born child symboli-
cally creates room for her to make a choice about how to
respond to their way of life. In contrast, from a physical perspec-
tive, the template is an older version of the clone. It is a strong
possibility that the similarity in appearance may convince the
child that the path of her future life is a foregone conclusion, or
at least greatly limited in the options it makes available to her.
Finally, there is good reason to fear that children who are
produced through the cloning process may not have as wide an
array of options as those available to similarly situated children
who were conceived naturally. The most crucial options made
available to children come from their parents; the successful pur-
suit of many life plans requires a solid foundation in early child-
hood training. Most children discover their own talents and
interests simultaneously with their parents, who adjust the
options they make available to their children accordingly. Par-
ents may have hopes for their children to become doctors, scien-
tists, musicians, or Olympic athletes. Yet parents have no real
reliance interest in the fulfillment of these hopes; they are fre-
quently forced to defer to their child's own assessment of her
interests and talents. In contrast, parents who decide to produce
and raise a clone of an individual who has already demonstrated
achievement in a particular area may believe that they know their
child's aptitudes and interests better than the child knows her-
self. Certain that their child has the same abilities of the great
musician who was her template, they may be less likely to defer to
her own desire to pursue mathematics. Moreover, parents of a
clone may believe they have a vested interest in having a child
whose life conforms to their standards for acceptable perform-
ance. After all, it is inevitable that the decision to engage the
cloning process, as well as the choice of a specific template, will
create specific expectations in the parent, which they believe are
justified by the genetic makeup of their child.
Human beings are not born autonomous; they grow to
become so, with care, training, and more than a little luck. At
least in the United States, about one-fourth of a person's life is
spent as a minor, under the guardianship and direction of her
parents. Do the circumstances under which a child is created
affect her chances for becoming an autonomous adult? Will chil-
dren who are clones be less likely to be given the conditions of
freedom than those conceived in other ways? In its ethical analy-
sis of cloning, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
addressed several issues bearing upon this question, such as
whether parents who raise a child produced through cloning are
likely to view that child as an object of their own creation and
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therefore inferior in dignity to them. Nonetheless, in framing
the question of whether cloning can be legally prohibited (after
it has proven to be physically safe and effective), the Commission
did not present these considerations as arising out of a commit-
ment to liberty, but as arrayed against it. Astonishingly, the only
parties presented as truly having liberty interests at stake in the
decision whether to prohibit cloning are the adults who desire to
create a child."0
One might respond that our society does not regulate the
decisions of individuals to have children according to whether or
not they are likely to raise them to be capable, autonomous
adults. We do not license parents before allowing them to have
children the natural way, despite the fact that many are incapable
of raising offspring who will flourish in a society that places high
regard on human freedom. Why should we suddenly concern
ourselves with this question when confronted with a new repro-
ductive technology such as cloning? A full answer to this ques-
tion is beyond the scope of this essay, but a couple of
considerations may be offered as a partial response. First, we
may very well want to recognize a moral duty on the part of indi-
viduals to have children only under circumstances in which they
believe they can raise children to be autonomous adults. Simply
put, parents have a duty to furnish their children with the basic
conditions of autonomy. Among other things, this-duty would
require parents to control their own ego investments in their
children's lives, so as not to impede their ability to enable the
children to forge their own identities.
Second, it is appropriate for the civil law to enforce this
parental duty, just as it does other duties to provide food and
shelter, so long as it can do so without infringing upon other
important values. For example, the law should not enforce this
duty by preventing certain persons from marrying and having
sexual relations, because these activities have an immense value
to those engaging in them that is distinct from the children that
can result from them. Nor should the law enforce it by compel-
ling some persons to use contraception or undergo abortions,
because such measures would invade their bodily integrity and
privacy. Furthermore, it goes without saying that any effort to
prevent some individuals from becoming parents while encour-
aging others to assume that role risks making the sort of unjustly
discriminatory judgments among persons that have been all too
frequent in American and global history.
30. See CLONING REPORT, supra note 3, at 87 (ch.5: Legal and Policy
Considerations) (June 1997) <http://bioethics.gov/pubs/chapter5.pdf>.
1999]
32 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13
However, none of these dangers is involved if American
lawmakers decide that no one should be allowed to create a child
through somatic cell nuclear transfer. A global prohibition
against human cloning would not raise problems of invidious dis-
crimination, either in intent or in effect. Furthermore, it would
involve no interference with the sexual activities or the bodily
integrity of persons of reproductive age. It would simply rule out
a particular means of creating new life that has been judged to
provide an inauspicious beginning to the process of nurturing
new human persons to adulthood. Such a conclusion would
likely be grounded on two practical judgments. First, apart from
the few hard cases noted in the Report, one could reasonably
conclude that motivations of many of those who would want to
obtain a child through cloning probably would be inconsistent
with the character traits necessary to raise a healthy, independent
child. Second, key aspects of the cloning process, including the
fact that the clone's genetic makeup is deliberately modeled on a
template chosen by the parents, would feed into these undesir-
able character traits, making the parents less willing to recognize
and temper their own egocentric qualities in raising the child.
What, then, of the reproductive liberty of those who wish to
become parents through the use of cloning? Raz's work offers a
helpful perspective on this question as well. While individuals
have an autonomy-based claim of access to an array of morally
valuable options through which to work out and express their
own identity, he maintains that they do not have a right to pur-
sue any particular option. This consideration is more decisive in
cases where the individuals have not taken any steps in reliance
on the existence of the option before it is foreclosed by govern-
mental decisionmaking 1 Clearly, at this point in time, no one
can have relied on the availability of human cloning in planning
their reproductive decisions.
Moreover, according to Raz, the ultimate worth of autonomy
is found in the fact that it makes possible a freely chosen, morally
worthwhile life; consequently, no one has a claim to pursue a
morally unacceptable option. 2 To the extent that cloning
unreasonably threatens the capacities for autonomy of the chil-
dren it brings into existence, it is morally unacceptable. Conse-
quently, it is highly doubtful that individuals have a right
grounded in reproductive liberty to obtain a child through
somatic cell nuclear transfer.
31. See RAz, supra note 27, at 410.
32. See id. at 378-81.
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Raz's analysis in The Morality of Freedom also invites us to look
at another aspect of the relationship between law and liberty that
is given short shrift by the Commission. While the Report explic-
itly acknowledges that the American people are highly commit-
ted to the value of individual liberty, it generally depicts this
commitment as issuing in legal policies that leave persons free to
make important life choices as they see fit. Its analysis fails to pay
sufficient attention to the fact that a person's ability to lead an
autonomous life largely depends upon her being situated in a
culture that values human autonomy and supports the condi-
tions for the exercise of that autonomy. In contrast with the
Commission, Raz recognizes that the individual's exercise of lib-
erty largely depends on a supportive social and institutional con-
text; he therefore acknowledges that one task of the government
is to foster the necessary cultural underpinnings of human free-
dom, through legislative means if necessary.3 3
While Raz recognizes that positive law can influence culture,
it would have been fruitful for him to explore the ways it does so
in more depth. As James Boyd White has recognized, law has a
constitutive function as well as a regulatory one; it not only
informs people what they may do or not do with respect to a
given issue, it provides the conceptual and imaginative frame-
work in which they consider the question in the first place.3 4
Furthermore, a law, particularly one pertaining to a highly con-
troversial topic embodying a number of conflicting values, can
have a symbolic function that extends far beyond its actual reach
in its influence on the moral sensibilities of the people. One
needs only to think of the Civil Rights Act35 or the Americans
with Disabilities Act3 6 to recognize that even one piece of legisla-
tion can powerfully encapsulate and transmit to the population a
vision of how we should live our lives together. In certain cir-
cumstances, the lack of law pertaining to a particular practice can
also function symbolically to convey a community's attitude
33. In an effort to reconcile his view of freedom with the liberal harm
principle, Raz argues that governments should support autonomy by non-
coercive means (e.g., subsides or rewards) unless coercive measures are
necessary to prevent harm. However, he observes that "one can harm another
by denying him what is due to him." Id. at 416. Since parents arguably have a
duty to provide their children with the conditions of autonomy, coercive
measures are not ruled out if necessary to enforce that duty and if appropriate
in other respects.
34. SeeJAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow 28-48 (1985).
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
36. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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toward that practice. While both liberal and non-liberal legal
theorists recognize that not everything that is immoral should be
subject to legal prohibition, many lay persons take the legal sta-
tus of an act to be a fairly reliable indicator of its moral status, at
least according to the canons of public morality.3 7 The fact that
a type of behavior is not prohibited indicates at the very least that
it is not a violation of the requirements of justice.
While cloning is not likely to be widely practiced, at least for
the foreseeable future, the fact that it is known to be done at all
will exert its grasp on the minds and hearts of more people than
those directly involved in the procedure. If it proceeds without
opposition, the practice of human cloning will alter our general
understanding of the nature and purpose of the parent-child
relationship. If cloning is perceived to be an appropriate
method of having a child, then the values it fosters are likely to
be viewed as consistent with virtuous parenthood in the vast
majority of cases in which parents decide to have their children
the "old-fashioned" way.
CONCLUSION
The basic problem with cloning is not that the morally
troubling egocentric motivations feared to prompt many people
to avail themselves of the cloning process are extraordinarily rep-
rehensible, or even that they are unique to them. Precisely the
opposite is the case. It is that these motivations can be found in
the heart of every human being who chooses to take on the won-
derful and terrifying vocation of parenthood. Each is a mixture
of good and bad, of altruism and selfishness; the decision to have
and raise a child is fueled by an admixture of concerns. All par-
ents have specific dreams for their children; most wish them suc-
cess and happiness that surpasses their own.
Yet from the very beginning, a naturally born newborn child
constitutes a mystery to her parents; as her temperament, gifts,
and flaws manifest themselves over time, her parents are forced
over and over again to recognize that she is an independent indi-
vidual who will want to choose her own plan of life, not to slip
37. An example of this phenomenon is the number of Americans
confronted with the Clinton scandal who considered adultery a purely private
matter not subject to public opprobrium. A liberal legal theorist could
consistently hold both that adultery should not be subject to criminal
prohibition and that it is a violation of public morality (e.g., a breach of a
publicly made marriage promise whose fulfillment is important to the
community at large as well as to the children born from the marriage).
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meekly (even if happily) into the plans laid out for her by her
parents.
This lesson is essential for parents raising children in a lib-
erty-loving society to learn; it is a necessary condition for raising
the next generation of autonomous citizens and perpetuating a
culture that values individual freedom. Needless to say, it is
harder for some to come to grips with this lesson than it is for
others. The basic danger involved in legalizing cloning is the
symbolic message that it will send to everyone who has chil-
dren.38 By allowing some parents to choose to create a child who
meets their specifications, whose biological and temperamental
makeup is in some significant sense test-driven or pre-lived, the
law will erode social support for the delicate goal of encouraging
parents not only to pass on their values to their children, but also
to provide them with the intellectual tools, the range of options,
and the freedom from manipulation that will allow them to make
those values truly their own. It will inevitably teach all parents
that they do not need to resist their understandable temptations
to conform their children to their own expectations. In a society
that cherishes autonomy, that is dangerous pedagogy indeed.
38. Needless to say, many of these same dangers are involved in questions
of genetic manipulation.
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